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Abstract—In recent years, the existence of a “social divide”,
comprising factors such as income and professional status, has
been noted as one significant type of social issue. It has been
stated that, among the disparate groups, a member belonging to
one group cannot move to any other groups. Such a rigidity in
terms of social status results in non-activation of the economy.
In this study, we have suggested a dynamic economic model
described by a multi-agent system, and have evaluated its
dynamics in order to try to understand the mechanisms by which
how the social divide emerges within the model. We used Gini’s
coefficient to evaluate the social divide and its economic efficiency.
As a result, it is suggested that economies under conditions of
low competitiveness, being a state composed of relatively more
consumer agents than producer agents, display a higher negative
relationship between Gini’s coefficient and economic efficiency
than those under conditions of high competitiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the existence of a “social divide”, com-
prising factors such as income and professional status, has
been noted as an emerging social issue. This “divide” is
defined as a difference in price, license, classification, or level
and amount of information within the same class. When the
income gap within a society is large, i.e., the society is in
a state where ‘blue-collar’ members are not able to escape
from the lowest levels in the hierarchy, then the motivation for
social development will atrophy and the society will become
economically dormant. In order to develop and maintain an
active society, both ultra-strong and ultra-weak levels of divide
are undesirable. So, is it possible to maintain an appropriate
level of divide in order to encourage social development?
There are various theories as to the cause of the emergence
of a social divide, such as academic background, aging of
society and part-time employment. However, the mechanisms
for the emergence of the social divide that are caused by
the economic system are unclear. In general, a system has
a tendency to generate a divide to adjust its overall efficiency.
For example, multi-cellular organisms differentiate their cells
into many functionally different parts to maintain the indi-
vidual’s life. Similarly, an economic system is composed of
characteristically different individuals.
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relation-
ship between the income divide and the economic efficiency
in an economic model, and is presented in this paper using
multi-agent simulation (MAS). MAS is often used when
studying the dynamic features of social phenomena [1], [2].
In our economic model, the agents learn their action using
reinforcement learning in order that they may be adapted to
the environment.
II. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM
A multi-agent system (MAS) is composed of many agents,
and achieves a task that is difficult to achieve for a single
agent or a monolithic system. In a MAS, an artificial society
comprising many autonomous behavioral agents interact with
each other in the simulation [1], [2]. We can contrast the
phenomena simulated by a MAS with those of the real world.
However, it is difficult to identify all of the relevant states
because the environment in the MAS changes depending on
the agent’s global features [3]. In this study, we constrain the
agent to acquire an action rule, adapting it to the environment
by using reinforcement learning.
III. REINFORECEMENT LEARNING
A. Definition
Reinforcement learning is a type of machine-learning that
treats the problem where an agent in an environment rec-
ognizes the current state, st ∈ S, and decides the action,
at ∈ A, to be taken [4]. When the agent chooses the action
at ∈ A, the state of the environment translates to st+1 ∈
S and the agent receives a reward (Fig.1). Reinforcement
learning makes the agent learn the policy that offers it the
maximum reward through its actions. Here the environment
is formulated as a Markov decision process that has a finite
number of states. Reinforcement learning is thought of as a
type of ‘dynamic programming’. It is different from supervised
learning, because such learning is not derived from a teacher.
It has an important feature in that the agent can choose
an action by developing an unknown-learning-area and an
action using a known-learning-area in a balanced manner.
Therefore, reinforcement learning is often used to achieve an
action rules for a robot under an unknown environment. Thus,
many methods of reinforcement learning have been proposed
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], especially in the following
section, where profit sharing achieves a higher performance
than alternatives when reinforcement learning is applied to the
MAS’ environment [12], [13]. Therefore, we have used profit
sharing in this study.
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Fig. 1. Transition of a state in reinforcement learning.
B. Profit Sharing
Profit sharing is one type of method for reinforcement
learning [12], [13]. In profit sharing, the agents are assigned
a Q-value which shows the efficacy of a rule that is based on
the agent’s actions, and the Q-value is updated after obtaining
the reward. The rule is a pairing of the state st ∈ S and the
action a ∈ A, which the agent can choose. With a state st ∈ S
assigned to the environment, the agent stochastically chooses
the action a ∈ A, based on policy pi(st, a). We then apply the
Boltzmann choice method [14].
pi(st, a) =
eQ(st,a)/T∑
a∈A eQ(st,a)/T
, (1)
where policy pi(st, a) is the probability of choosing action a
in response to state st, and T is a temperature parameter. The
agent implements action a, and, as a result, the agent receives
the reward rt. The Q-value, which takes the action a for state
st, is updated as follows,
Q(st, at)← (1− β)Q(st, at) + βrt, (2)
where β(0 ≤ β ≤ 1) represents the learning-rate.
Profit sharing is a type of non-boot-strap reinforcement
learning, i.e., it does not require the next state’s Q-value when
updating. Therefore, it shows a higher performance than the
boot-strap method when reinforcement learning is applied to
an MAS environment.
IV. PRODUCER ECONOMIC MODEL
In the mechanism of the emergence of a social divide, it
is foreseen that the mechanism is included in the economic
system. In this study, in order to restage the emergence of
social divides as macro phenomena that are caused by the
action of micro economic entities, we have structured an
economic model using a MAS. In the model, we set ‘multi-
merchandises’ and ‘multi-agents’. The merchandises are de-
fined by the combination and permutation of two types of pri-
mordial merchandise. There are three types of agent; namely
the supplier agent, the producer agent and the consumer agent.
A supplier agent produces unlimited primordial merchandise,
and sells it. A producer agent purchases merchandise com-
prising materials for his product, and he produces his product
by using materials and then sells it at a price. The consumer
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Fig. 2. Flow of merchandise in a producer economic model.
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Fig. 3. Combination of materials and products.
agent purchases the merchandise that is finally produced by
the producer agents. Fig.2 shows the flow of merchandise
in a producer model. The producer agents learn appropriate
action-rules concerning whether or not to purchase the material
merchandise and how to price their product merchandise by
reinforcement learning. The supplier agents and the consumer
agents act on previously-determined action rules, i.e., not
learned. In this producer economic model, we focus on the
actions of the producer agents in the economic system. Here,
we observe income division between the producer agents
and the economic efficiency in this system, and evaluate the
relationship between them.
A. Setting of merchandise
In this model, there are two types of primordial merchan-
dise. We name these A and B. Merchandise AB is produced by
combining A and B. In addition, merchandise BA is produced
by combining A and B. Here, two kinds of merchandise can
be produced by permutation. However, when the two materials
are the same, such as both A and A or both B and B, only
one kind of product merchandise can be produced, such as
AA or BB (Fig.3). Here, we describe merchandise A and
B as ‘mono-bona merchandise’, and merchandise AB, BA,
AA and BB as ‘di-bona merchandise’. TABLE 1 shows the
product merchandise and the combinations of the materials
that constitute product merchandise up to the ‘tetra-bona
level’.
B. Setting of agents
The supplier agents sell merchandise A or B at a pre-
established price, pA. The consumer agents purchase pre-
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TABLE I
MATERIALS OF PRODUCT.
Product Material
Di-bona AA A+A
AB A+B
BA B+A
BB B+B
Tri-bona AAA A+AA,AA+A
AAB A+AB,AA+B
ABA A+BA,AB+A
ABB A+BB,AB+B
BAA B+AA,BA+A
BAB B+AB,BA+B
BBA B+BA,BB+A
BBB B+BB,BB+B
Tetra-bona AAAA A+AAA,AA+AA,AAA+A
AAAB A+AAB,AA+AB,AAA+B
AABA A+ABA,AA+BA,AAB+A
AABB A+ABB,AA+BB,AAB+B
ABAA A+BAA,AB+AA,ABA+A
ABAB A+BAB,AB+AB,ABA+A
ABBA A+BBA,AB+BA,ABB+A
ABBB A+BBB,AB+BB,ABB+B
BAAA B+AAA,BA+AA,BAA+A
BAAB B+AAB,BA+AB,BAA+B
BABA B+ABA,BA+BA,BAB+A
BABB B+ABB,BA+BB,BAB+B
BBAA B+BAA,BB+AA,BBA+A
BBAB B+BAB,BB+AB,BBA+B
BBBA B+BBA,BB+BA,BBB+A
BBBB B+BBB,BB+BB,BBB+B
established merchandise from the producer agent who sells
it at the cheapest price.
The producer agent has the following properties,
M1 :Material merchandise 1
M2 :Material merchandise 2
P :Product merchandiseM 1 +M2.
vM1 :Minimum price of material merchandise 1
vM2 :Minimum price of material merchandise 2
vt−1P :Maximum price of product merchandise that was
purchased on the last occasion.
s :s = (vM1 + vM2 , v
t−1
P ). State that is recognized by
the producer agent
a :a = (Buy, vP ). Action that is chosen by producer
agent
Buy :Variable that decides purchasing of material mer-
chandise. It has values 0 or 1. When the agent does
not purchase, Buy is 0. When the agent purchases,
Buy is 1
vP :Sale’s price at next occasion. 0 ≤ vP ≤ 30.
C :Cost. If Buy = 0, C = 0 because the agent does
not purchase anything. If Buy = 1, C = vM1 +vM2 .
I :Sale. If the agent’s product merchandise is pur-
chased, I = vP , otherwise I = 0.
R :Income. R = I − C. It is also a reward on
reinforcement learning.
Q(s,a) :Q-value of state s for action a.
C. Action of agents
Step1. Each property of the agent is initialized.
Step2. An agent is selected from the producer and the
consumer agents.
Step3. The selected agent recognizes the state s. The agent
implements Step4 and Step5 when this agent is the
producer agent, M1 and M2 are sold. If this agent is
the producer agent and M1 and/or M2 are not sold,
he does not implement Step4 and Step5, because in
this case he can’t produce his product. If this agent
is the consumer agent, he purchases pre-established
merchandise from the producer agent who sells at
the cheapest price.
Step4. The agent stochastically chooses action a based on
the Q-value.
Step5. If Buy = 1, the agent purchases M1 and M2 from
agents who sell them at prices of vM1 and vM2 ,
respectively.
Step6. All of the producers agents and the consumer agents
implement Step2 to Step5.
Step7. All of the producer agents update the Q-values.
Step8. All of the producer agents produce their products
using purchased material merchandises. All of the
consumer agents consume his merchandise.
Step9. Reaches an end condition when the simulation ter-
minates; otherwise returns to Step2.
We define the flow from Step2 to Step8 as one episode.
V. GINI’S COEFFICIENT
Gini’s coefficient (GC) is one of the barometers of social
divide in economics, and has a real value between 0 and 1
[15]. When the social divide becomes larger, GC is close
to 1. Assuming the presence of n ‘non-negative’ samples,
y1, y2, y3, ..., yn(y1 ≤ y2 ≤ y3 ≤ ... ≤ yn), then GC is
defined as
GC =
1
2µyn2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|yi − yj |, (3)
where µy represents the average of yi(i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n). When
all of the samples are the same, GC = 0. GC is also defined
as “The ratio of the area that is surrounded by the Lorenz
curve and the line of equal share to the area of the triangle
that is under the line of equal share” (Fig.4). The Lorenz curve
is described by the summation of the samples to i from 1, that
is,
φi =
i∑
j=1
yj . (4)
If we denote that the area that is bounded by the Lorenz
curve and the line of equal share as A, the area under the
Lorenz curve as B and the area of the triangle that is under
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Fig. 4. Lorenz curve.
line of equal share as C, then GC is approximated as
GC = A/C
= (C −B)/C
= 1−B/C
= 1−
n∑
i=1
φi/(µyn2/2)
= 1− 2
µyn2
n∑
i=1
φi. (5)
However, GC cannot be used to evaluate the divide cor-
rectly when the samples include negative values. In this case,
GC has the possibility of a value smaller then 0 or greater
than 1. In fact, in the producer economic model considered
in this study, the agent’s income may be negative. Therefore,
we need to extend GC to evaluate the divide emerging in our
model. Assuming n samples, y1, y2, y3, ..., yn(y1 ≤ y2 ≤ y3 ≤
... ≤ yn ; yi corresponds to R in section IV), and the samples
from yi to yx take negative values. Then, the minimum of the
Lorenz curve is,
φx =
x∑
i=1
yi. (6)
We redefine GC in an extended description from a geomet-
ric view-point, i.e., “The ratio of the area that is surrounded
by the Lorenz curve and the line of equal share to the area
of a quadrangle defined by (0, 0), (0, φx), (n, φx), (n, µn)
” (Fig.5). Then, the extended Gini’s coefficient (GE) can be
described as
GE = 1− 2
µyn2 − 2φxn
n∑
i=1
(φi − 2φx), (7)
where GE has a value between 0 and 1 and GE is approxi-
mated as
GE =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|zi − zj |
2µzn2
, (8)
where zi is the linear transformation of yi following as
zi = yi − 2φx
n
. (9)
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Fig. 5. Generarized Lorenz curve.
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Fig. 6. Relationship between economic efficiency and income divide when
the number of consumer agents is 16.
µz represents the average of zi(i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n). Using yi,
GE is expressed as
GE =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|yi − yj |
2(µy − 2φxn )n2
. (10)
VI. SIMULATION
We simulated 30,000 episodes with the price of mono-bona
pA set from 1 to 6. The number of di-bona producer agents,
tri-bona producer agents and tetra-bona producer agents were
64, 32 and 48, respectively. We recorded the average value
of GE and the average of economic efficiency from episode
20,000 to 30,000. Because the producer agent achieved suffi-
cient learning, the process was terminated at episode 20,000.
Economic efficiency is defined as
∑
N I/
∑
N C, where N is
the number of producer agents, the learning-rate is β = 0.1,
and the temperature parameter T is 1.0.
Fig. 6 , Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 corresponding to the cases in which
the number of consumer agents were 16, 32, 48, respectively,
show the average of GE and the economic efficiency. The
abscissas and ordinates represent the economic efficiency and
GE, respectively. These figures show that economic efficiency
decreases with increasing price of mono-bona pA. This is
because the maximum price that can be asked by the producer
agent is fixed, in spite of increasing pA. The producer agents,
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Fig. 7. Relationship between economic efficiency and income divide when
the number of consumer agents is 32.
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Fig. 8. Relationship between economic efficiency and income divides when
the number of consumer agents is 48.
who produce the product made from mono-bona, can increase
the price of the product. The tri-bona producer agents increase
the price more. The tetra-bona producer agents can-not price
above 30, which is the upper limit of the price, so the tetra-
bona producer agents’ incomes decrease. Therefore, economic
efficiency decreases. Economic efficiency is increased with
increasing the number of consumer agents. This is because
of the increased demand with increasing number of consumer
agents, and the producer agents can sell their product at higher
prices.
These figures show that GE increased with increasing pA.
In particular, when the numbers of consumer agents is 48,
GE exhibits a greater change than in the remaining cases. In
the cases where the number of consumer agents are 16 and
32, numbers of the consumer agents are less than those of
the tetra-bona producer agents. Therefore, a price-cutting war
forces GE higher. On the other hand, when the number of
consumer agents is 48, the number of consumer agents and
tetra-bona producer agents are the same, so the price-cutting
war does not occur. Therefore, GE depends on pA.
As a result, it is implied that economic efficiency will be
reduced by increasing the price of primordial merchandise,
and the income divide is increased with reducing economic
efficiency. Most notably, when the number of producers and
consumers are the same, i.e., when the supply and the demand
are the same, the dynamic of the income divide shows an S-
shaped curve for the change in the economic efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we proposed a producer economic model to
evaluate the relationship between economic efficiency and in-
come divide. The results is suggested that for economics under
conditions of low competitiveness, being a state composed of
relatively more consumer agents than producer agents, display
a higher negative relationship between Gini’s coefficient and
the economic efficiency than those operating under high com-
petitiveness. In addition, the dynamics of the income divide
yields an S-shaped curve for the change in economic efficiency
when the supply corresponds to the demand.
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